International financial reform: the broad agenda by Ocampo, José Antonio
Executive Secretary of the
Economic Commission
for Latin America and
the Caribbean (ECLAC).
This paper argues that the agenda for international financial re-
form must be broadened in at least two senses. First of all, it
should go beyond the issues of financial crisis prevention and
resolution, to those associated with development finance for
poor and small countries and to the “ownership” of economic
and development policies by countries. Secondly, it should con-
sider not only the role of world institutions but also of regional
arrangements and the explicit definition of areas where national
autonomy should be maintained. These issues should be tabled
in a representative, balanced negotiation process capable of
overcoming some of the adverse political economy features
that characterize the current debate. After some initial consider-
ations of the nature of the problems that the current system
faces and some political economy aspects, the author addresses
the following issues: i) the reforms relating to the prevention
and resolution of financial crises; ii) the role of development fi-
nance, including the use of multilateral development finance to
support increased participation of low-income and small mid-
dle-income countries in private capital markets and the financ-
ing of social safety nets during crises; iii) the need to reach a
renewed international agreement on the limits of conditionality
and full recognition of the central role of the “ownership” of
development and macroeconomic policies by developing coun-
tries; iv) the role of regional and subregional institutions in in-
creasing the supply of “global public goods” and other services
in the area of international finance; and v) the need to maintain
several realms of national autonomy, including capital account
regulation and the choice of exchange rate regimes. The author
argues that regional institutions and national autonomy are par-
ticularly important for the smaller players in the international
arena, who would gain significantly from competition in the
services provided to them and from the maintenance of free-
dom of action in a context of imperfect supply of global public
goods.
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I
Introduction
The recent phase of financial turmoil that started in
Asia, crossed through Russia and reached Latin
America generated a deep sense that fundamental re-
forms were required in the international financial ar-
chitecture to prevent financial crises and improve
their management when they occur. The crisis led,
indeed, to the recognition that there is an enormous
discrepancy between the sophisticated and dynamic
financial world and the institutions that regulate it,
and that “existing institutions are inadequate to deal
with financial globalization”.1
The crisis gave rise to some positive responses:
a concerted expansionary effort led by the United
States, which was probably the crucial step that facil-
itated the fairly rapid though incomplete normaliza-
tion of capital markets; the approval of new credit
lines and the expansion of International Monetary
Fund (IMF) resources; the recognition that incentives
must be created to induce more suitable debt profiles
in developing countries; a special boost for interna-
tional efforts to establish minimum standards of pru-
dential regulation and supervision, as well as of
information; the partial acceptance by the IMF that
fiscal overkill is inappropriate in adjustment
programmes; the improvement of the Highly In-
debted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative; and the
greater emphasis given to the design of adequate so-
cial safety nets in developing countries. Some re-
sponses were positive but do not seem to be leading
in any clear direction (or even seem to be leading in
the wrong one). This is the case of the adoption of
collective action clauses in issues of external debt se-
curities, as an essential step to facilitate internation-
ally agreed debt standstills and workout procedures.
In some cases, the responses were insufficient or
clearly inadequate: IMF conditionality was further
extended; the issues associated with stable arrange-
ments to guarantee the coherence of the macro-
economic policies of industrialized countries did not
receive sufficient scrutiny; the Japanese proposal to
create an Asian Monetary Fund gave rise to
undeservedly strong opposition that led to its rapid
dismissal; more generally, the role that regional in-
stitutions can play in an appropriate international fi-
nancial arrangement was not given adequate
attention; and no steps were taken to ensure the fair
representation of developing countries in the discus-
sions on reform or in a revised international architec-
ture.
The fairly rapid normalization of capital markets
seems to be giving way to a sense of complacency
that could slow down the reform effort. Moreover, it
may lead efforts in the wrong direction, as for exam-
ple in giving give new impetus to discussions on cap-
ital account convertibility. On the other hand, the
calmer environment could be taken as an opportunity
to broaden the agenda and to set in motion a repre-
sentative, balanced negotiation process. The agenda
should be broadened in at least two senses: first of
all, it should go beyond the issues of financial crisis
prevention and resolution (which may be termed the
“narrow” financial architecture)2 to include those as-
sociated with development finance and the “owner-
ship” by the countries of economic and, particularly,
development policies; secondly, it should consider, in
a systematic fashion, not only the role of world insti-
tutions, but also that of regional arrangements and
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the areas where national autonomy should be main-
tained. This is the focus of this paper. The following
two sections present brief introductory reflections on
the nature of the problems that the system faces and
the political economy of the reform effort. The paper
then goes on to deal with crisis prevention and man-
agement, development finance, the issue of condi-
tionality versus “ownership” of policies, which
concerns both sides, the role of regional institutions,
and national regulations and autonomy.
II
The nature of the problems
facing the system
International capital flows to developing countries
have exhibited four outstanding features in the
1990s.3 First of all, official and private flows have
shown opposite patterns: whereas the former have
tended to decline, private capital flows have experi-
enced rapid medium-term growth. Secondly, differ-
ent private flows have exhibited striking differences
in terms of stability. Thirdly, private flows have been
concentrated in middle-income countries, with offi-
cial flows playing only a very partial redistributive
role at the world level. Finally, the instability of pri-
vate financial flows has required the design of major
emergency rescue packages, of unprecedented size,
which have concentrated funds in a few large
“emerging” economies.
The first two patterns are shown in table 1. Both
foreign direct investment (FDI) and all types of pri-
vate financial flows have registered strong me-
dium-term growth. However, these flows have
exhibited striking differences in terms of stability:
whereas FDI has been resilient in the face of crises,
private financial flows have experienced strong vola-
tility and “contagion” effects. In contrast, official de-
velopment finance and particularly its largest
component, bilateral aid, has lagged behind. Indeed,
bilateral aid has fallen in real terms throughout the
decade, and in 1998 it is estimated to have amounted
to only 0.22% of the GDP of industrialized countries:
a significant fall with respect to the 0.35% of GDP
reached in the mid-1980s.4 The reduction in bilateral
aid has been strongest in the case of the largest in-
dustrialized countries, though this trend has been
partly offset, in terms of effective resource transfers,
by the increasing share of grants in official develop-
ment assistance. Also, contrary to private flows, offi-
cial finance has not been pro-cyclical and, indeed,
some components of it –particularly balance of pay-
ments support but also multilateral development fi-
nance– have displayed counter-cyclical behaviour.
The third pattern is shown in table 2. Private
flows have been strongly concentrated in mid-
dle-income countries. The share of low-income na-
tions in private financing has been lower than their
share in the total population of developing countries,
which was to be expected, but it is also lower than
their share in developing countries’ GDP. This situa-
tion is particularly striking in the case of bond fi-
nancing, commercial banking and portfolio flows, if
India is excluded in the latter case. In all these cases,
private financing to poor countries is minimal. The
share of low-income countries in FDI is also smaller
than their contribution to developing countries’ GDP.
Moreover, a striking feature of FDI is its high concen-
tration in China, which, on the contrary, receives a
smaller proportion of financial flows. The high con-
centration of the most volatile flows in mid-
dle-income countries, excluding China, has meant in
turn that questions of financial volatility and conta-
gion have become particularly important for them.
Low-income countries have thus been
marginalized from private flows and have continued
to depend on declining official resource flows. More
specifically, they have been strongly dependent on
official development assistance, particularly grants,
coming mostly in the form of bilateral aid. If we
again exclude India, this is the only component of
the net resource flows to developing countries that is
highly progressive, in the sense that the share of
low-income countries exceeds not only their share in
3 For a full evaluation of these trends, see UNCTAD (1999,
chapters III and V) and World Bank (1999).
4 World Bank, 1999, chap. 4, p. 70.
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developing countries’ GDP but also in population.
This is also true of multilateral financing, excluding
the IMF.
The volatility of private financial flows, on the
one hand, and their strong concentration in mid-
dle-income countries, on the other, have jointly gen-
erated the need for exceptional financing on an
unprecedented scale, which has been concentrated in
a few “emerging” countries. As a result, IMF (includ-
ing Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility) financ-
ing has exhibited strong counter-cyclical behaviour
compared with private flows but has been concen-
trated in a few countries. As figure 1 indicates, both
patterns are closely associated, as cyclical borrowing
by a few countries is the major determinant of the
overall cyclical pattern. This latter feature has be-
come even more marked in recent years. Thus,
whereas India and the three largest Latin American
borrowers received less than half of net real flows
from the Fund in 1980-1984, net real flows to only
four large borrowers (Indonesia, Republic of Korea,
the Russian Federation and Mexico) have in fact
exceeded by a small margin the total net real flows
from the Fund in 1995-1997. As a result, the share
of IMF financing going to large borrowers5 has
displayed a strong upward trend over the past two
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TABLE 1
Net long-term resource flows to developing countries,a 1990-1998
(Billions of dollars)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998b
Net long-term resource flows 100.8 123.1 152.3 220.2 223.6 254.9 308.1 338.1 275.0
Official 56.9 62.6 54.0 53.3 45.5 53.4 32.2 39.1 47.9
Private 43.9 60.5 98.3 167.0 178.1 201.5 275.9 299.0 227.1
From international capital markets 19.4 26.2 52.2 100.0 89.6 96.1 149.5 135.5 72.1
Private debt flows 15.7 18.6 38.1 49.0 54.4 60.0 100.3 105.3 58.0
Commercial banks 3.2 4.8 16.3 3.3 13.9 32.4 43.7 60.1 25.1
Bonds 1.2 10.8 11.1 37.0 36.7 26.6 53.5 42.6 30.2
Other 11.4 3.0 10.7 8.6 3.7 1.0 3.0 2.6 2.7
Portfolio equity flows 3.7 7.6 14.1 51.0 35.2 36.1 49.2 30.2 14.1
Foreign direct investment 24.5 34.4 46.1 67.0 88.5 105.4 126.4 163.4 155.0
Source: World Bank, Global Development Finance 1999.
a Net long-term resource flows are defined as net liability transactions of original maturity greater than one year. Although the Republic of
Korea is a high-income country, it is included in the developing country aggregate since it is a borrower from the World Bank.
b Preliminary.
5 This group includes Argentina, Brazil, China, Indonesia,
India, Republic of Korea, Mexico and the Russian Federation.
FIGURE 1
Use of IMF credit, 1970-1997
Amount
Composition
Low-income countries, Low middle-income
excluding India countries, excluding China,
Russia and Indonesia
Upper middle-income Large borrowers
countries, excluding
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TABLE 2
Net flow of resources, 1992-1997
(Annual averages, billions of dollars and percentages)
Foreign direct Portfolio equity MultilateralGrants Bilateral financing financinginvestment flows (excluding IMF)
Amount Percen- Amount Percen- Amount Percen- Amount Percen- Amount Percen-
tage tage tage tage tage
Developing countries 99.0 100.0 35.7 100.0 29.7 100.0 2.9 100.0 13.7 100.0
Excluding China 66.8 67.5 31.7 88.9 29.4 99.0 0.5 19.0 11.6 84.5
Low-income countries 6.7 6.8 3.4 9.5 15.8 53.2 0.8 27.1 5.9 43.4
India 1.6 1.6 2.5 6.9 0.6 1.9 -0.3 -11.3 1.0 7.4
Other countries 5.1 5.2 0.9 2.6 15.2 51.3 1.1 38.4 4.9 36.0
China a 32.1 32.5 3.9 11.1 0.3 1.0 2.3 81.0 2.1 15.5
Middle-income countries 60.1 60.8 28.3 79.4 13.7 46.1 -0.2 -8.1 5.6 41.1
Argentina 4.4 4.5 1.7 4.9 - 0.1 -0.1 -3.2 0.9 6.6
Brazil 7.7 7.7 4.1 11.5 0.1 0.2 -1.3 -43.4 -0.1 -0.6
Russian Federation 1.9 1.9 1.1 3.1 1.1 3.7 0.6 21.4 0.9 6.2
Indonesia 3.5 3.6 2.4 6.8 0.2 0.8 1.2 41.7 0.1 0.9
Republic of Korea b 1.5 1.5 3.1 8.8 - - -0.2 -5.4 0.6 4.1
Mexico 8.1 8.2 5.1 14.3 - 0.1 -0.6 -21.4 0.3 2.2
Other countries 33.0 33.3 10.7 30.1 12.2 41.2 0.1 2.2 3.0 21.7
Commercial bank
Bonds loans Other loans Total Memo:
Amount Percen- Amount Percen- Amount Percen- Amount Percen- GDP Popula-
tage tage tage tage tion
Developing countries 34.6 100.0 28.3 100.0 4.9 100.0 248.7 100.0 100.0 100.0
Excluding China 32.9 95.2 26.6 94.0 1.1 21.4 200.7 80.7 89.2 74.8
Low-income countries 0.5 1.5 0.9 3.3 0.4 7.2 34.5 13.9 11.4 41.0
India 0.4 1.1 0.8 2.8 0.4 8.9 6.9 2.8 5.6 19.3
Other countries 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.6 -0.1 -1.7 27.6 11.1 5.8 21.7
China a 1.7 4.8 1.7 6.0 3.9 78.6 48.0 19.3 10.8 25.2
Middle-income countries 32.4 93.7 25.7 90.7 0.7 14.2 166.3 66.9 77.8 33.9
Argentina 5.5 15.9 0.8 2.9 - -0.9 13.3 5.3 5.0 0.7
Brazil 3.1 9.0 8.2 29.0 -0.6 -11.3 21.2 8.5 10.5 3.3
Russian Federation 0.8 2.2 0.3 1.1 1.4 28.7 8.1 3.2 7.3 3.1
Indonesia 1.6 4.7 0.9 3.2 0.2 3.7 10.2 4.1 3.4 4.0
Republic of Korea b 4.5 12.9 4.1 14.5 -0.2 -4.8 13.4 5.4 7.3 0.9
Mexico 5.2 15.2 0.3 1.1 -0.3 -6.9 18.2 7.3 6.7 1.9
Other countries 11.7 33.8 11.0 38.9 0.3 5.6 81.9 32.9 37.6 19.8
Source: World Bank, Global Development Finance, 1999, Washington , D.C., March 1999 and World Economic Indicators, Washington,
D.C., 1998 for GDP and population data.
a The World Bank considered China as a low-income country until 1998. Since 1999 it has been classified as a middle-income country. In
this table it is considered in a separate category.
b The World Bank classifies it as a high-income country, but it is included as a middle-income country in Global Development Finance,
1999.
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decades. Indeed, in recent years, the IMF financing
data underestimate the magnitude of emergency fi-
nancing to large borrowers, as the bilateral contribu-
tions to the rescue packages of six nations
(Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Thailand, Russia,
Brazil and Mexico) are not included in the figures.6
Strictly speaking, however, “crowding out” by
the largest borrowers does not seem to have taken
place, as overall Fund financing has responded elasti-
cally to the needs of these large borrowers, with fi-
nancing to other poorer or smaller middle-income
countries remaining unchanged or even increasing
marginally when they also require additional balance
of payments financing. This was the case in the
1980s for much of the developing world and has also
been true of the supply of finance to the medium-
sized Asia-Pacific nations in recent years. In any
case, IMF and counterpart bilateral liquidity financing
have complemented private funds throughout the
business cycle. Given the high concentration of pri-
vate financing in middle-income countries, this has
led to a similar pattern of concentration in the case of
official liquidity financing. In the context of a signif-
icant scarcity of official finance for low-income
countries, the high concentration of balance of pay-
ments financing in a few large “emerging” econo-
mies raises significant concern about the overall
rationality governing the distribution of global capi-
tal flows, including even official flows. It certainly
raises questions about whether the problems of the
largest developing countries generate specific biases
in the response of the international community.
Thus, although the volatility and contagion ex-
hibited by private capital flows, which have been at
the centre of recent debates, are certainly a matter for
concern, no less important problems are the
marginalization of the poorest countries from private
capital flows and the decline in the bilateral aid on
which they largely depend. International financial re-
forms must thus be focused also on guaranteeing so-
lutions to all these problems. Moreover, the debt
overhang of many developing countries, particularly
poor ones, continues to weigh heavily on their devel-
opment possibilities.
III
Some reflections on the political
economy of the reform process
The nature of the current controversies regarding in-
ternational financial reform reflects three features of
the political economy of the globalization process
which is under way. The first is the reluctance of
most countries, both industrialized and developing
countries alike, to give up economic sovereignty to
international organizations. Under the influence of
the strong market forces characteristic of globaliza-
tion, which tend to weaken the nation-State, and the
concomitant unilateral national liberalization pro-
cesses that many countries have followed, govern-
ment regulations have lost ground all over the world.
Many analysts perceive this result as an advance, but
it is also a source of significant distortions and risks.
Indeed, the issues associated with capital flows that
are discussed in section IV below are a good exam-
ple of cases where most analysts agree that inade-
quate regulation –both national and international–
has been an essential determinant of market instabil-
ity. Another good example is that of “fair trade”
rules, such as antidumping and countervailing duties,
which, when applied at the national level, are gener-
ally suboptimal compared with other forms of regu-
lating competition, such as antitrust provisions, and
may create distortions of their own, even if applied
within World Trade Organization rules. National re-
strictions on labour mobility also generate distor-
tions, and the asymmetric character of factor
mobility (i.e., the greater mobility of capital and
skilled labour versus unskilled labour) generates
strong adverse income distribution pressures world-
wide.7
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The second feature is the disorganization of the
actors, particularly developing countries, in the inter-
national policy debate. This may be a reflection of
the weakening of the historical mechanisms of con-
certed action (such as the Group of 77), but it also re-
flects the “policy competition” that globalization
itself has generated: the great incentive that each
country has to claim that it is more attractive for in-
vestment in an era of mobile capital and a decline in
the importance of traditional production location fac-
tors. This has raised the costs of generating interna-
tional coalitions and implies that the international
agenda may tend to be even more biased than it tradi-
tionally has been towards the largest countries and
best organized coalitions, which are unlikely to fully
internalize the effects that their policies and agendas
have on the rest of the world. It should probably be
added that, although open regionalism is also a fea-
ture of globalization, and strong integration forces
have been at work in many parts of the developing
world (e.g., Latin America and Southeast Asia), this
has not led to strong developing-country coalitions.
The fact is that, the European Union aside, countries
are also unwilling to give up their sovereignty even
to regional institutions.
The disorganization of the actors is closely asso-
ciated with a third feature of globalization: the in-
complete and even lopsided character of the
international policy agenda that accompanies the
process, i.e., the strong thrust in some directions but,
on the contrary, a disregard for others that should
equally be part of a more balanced globalization pro-
cess. Four issues figure predominantly in the agenda:
free trade, intellectual property rights, investment
protection and capital account liberalization. The lat-
ter has been subject to some reservations in the light
of the recent crises: it should be gradual, emphasis
should be given to longer-term flows, and strong pru-
dential regulations and supervision should precede it.
Other issues are conspicuously left aside: labour mo-
bility, international rules on capital taxation (essen-
tial to guarantee adequate taxation of this highly
mobile factor), the design of truly international rules
on competition and codes of conduct for multina-
tional firms, and compensatory financing and tech-
nology transfers to guarantee the inclusion of those
countries which tend to be left behind in the global-
ization process.
These political economy elements have major
implications for international financial reform. The
most obvious are that there are only likely to be
weak pressures for substantial reform,8 that design-
ing a balanced negotiation process will be a complex
business, and that negotiation processes may under-
estimate or bypass altogether the interests of certain
actors. Obviously, the ideal outcome would be for
adequate fora and a broad agenda to be chosen, so as
to adequately represent the interests of those actors
who would otherwise not have a strong voice.9 These
elements also imply that the international financial
architecture will continue to rely essentially on a net-
work of national institutions, so that its major task is
the creation of adequate incentives for these institu-
tions to internalize the externalities that they gener-
ate among themselves. This means, in turn, that
national autonomy will continue to play a central
role in many (if not most) policy areas and that pol-
icy instruments that are ruled out at the national level
(such as certain restrictions on market activities, or
unilateral debt standstills) should probably be left
open as options at the international level.
A final, crucial implication is that no interna-
tional financial architecture is neutral in terms of the
balance of international relations. It will be strongly
argued in this paper that an international system that
relies on one or a few international institutions will
be less balanced than one that relies on a network of
regional institutions, and that countries with very
limited power in the international arena will be better
off if they have access to a broader menu of alterna-
tives for managing a potential crisis or financing de-
velopment than if they are restricted to fewer
options. The first part of this proposition means, in
fact, that the strongest defence mechanism for the
weaker actors is competition in the supply of support
to them. The second means that, in the absence of
adequate international support, the “second-best” so-
lution may be more, rather than less, national auton-
omy. National autonomy obviously has costs, as the
greater menu of alternatives for managing crises
must be traded off against the need to generate “cred-
ibility”: a factor that inclines developing countries to
adopt the policy package they believe the market
considers to represent best practice (a result of the
“policy competition” to which we alluded earlier).
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The issues associated with the prevention and resolu-
tion of financial crises have received extensive atten-
tion in recent discussions.10 The most important area
of agreement relates to the need to improve the insti-
tutional framework in which financial markets oper-
ate: that is to say, to strengthen prudential regulation,
supervision and accounting practices of financial
systems worldwide; to adopt minimum international
standards in these areas and sound principles of cor-
porate governance; and to improve the information
provided to financial markets. From the point of
view of the industrialized countries, the central is-
sues for their corresponding domestic agencies are
stricter regulation and supervision of highly lever-
aged institutions and operations, controls on offshore
centres, and the need for greater weight to be given
to the risks associated with operations with countries
having a high level of net indebtedness, particularly
of a short-term character, in order to discourage risky
financing at the source.
From the point of view of the borrowing econo-
mies, greater weight should be given by domestic
regulators to the accumulation of short-term liabili-
ties in foreign currencies, to risks associated with the
rapid growth of credit, to currency mismatches of as-
sets and liabilities, and to the valuation of fixed as-
sets as collateral during episodes of asset inflation.
Most importantly, due account should be taken of
the links between domestic financial risks and
changes in key macroeconomic policy instruments,
notably exchange and interest rates. This indicates
that prudential standards should be stricter in devel-
oping countries, where such links are more impor-
tant, and that they should be strengthened during
periods of financial euphoria to take into account the
increasing risks being incurred by financial interme-
diaries. Due account should also be taken of the im-
portant externalities which large non-financial firms
could generate for the domestic financial sector,
which means that the level of external liabilities of
these firms should also be regulated. We will return
to these issues in section VIII below.
Nonetheless, substantial divergences of opinion
remain. Firstly, there is no consensus as to what kind
of institutions should be entrusted with enhanced re-
sponsibilities in this field. The Bank for International
Settlements (BIS) should certainly play the leading
role, but this requires a significant expansion of de-
veloping-country membership in that organization
and of developing-country participation in the defini-
tion of all sorts of international standards and codes
of conduct in general. More ambitious proposals,
such as the creation of a World Financial Authority
on the basis of the BIS and the International Organi-
zation of Securities Commissions, should also be
considered.11 Secondly, although the essential role of
regulation and supervision is to make financial inter-
mediaries more risk-conscious, there are clear limits
to the appropriateness of discouraging private
risk-taking. Thirdly, differences exist as to the rela-
tive merits of prudential regulation and supervision
versus other possible instruments in key areas. One
particularly relevant issue in this regard, as we will
see below, relates to capital account regulation.
Fourthly, there are significant differences of opinion
as to what can be expected from enhanced prudential
regulation and supervision, since regulations will
tend to lag behind financial innovations, supervisors
are likely to face significant information problems,
and macroeconomic events may overwhelm even
well-regulated systems. Finally, traditional prudential
regulation and supervision tend to have pro-cyclical
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10 See, among others, Camdessus (1998a and 1998b), IMF
(1998), IMF, Interim Committee of the Board of Governors on
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Ocampo (1999), Ocampo (1999a and 1999b), White (1999) and
Wyplosz (1999). 11 Eatwell and Taylor (1999).
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macroeconomic effects (they may be unable to pre-
vent excessive risk-taking during booms and they
may accelerate the credit crunch during crises, when
bad loans become evident and the effects of
provisioning standards are thus felt): a fact which
may increase rather than decrease credit risks
through the business cycle.
Equally important are the doubts as to what can
be expected from better information. Indeed, al-
though improved information enhances microeco-
nomic efficiency, it may not improve macroeconomic
stability, which is dominated by the evolution of
opinions and expectations rather than information in
the strict sense of that term (i.e., factual information).
The tendency to equate opinions and expectations
with “information” is one of the greatest confusions
in the recent literature. Well-informed agents (rating
agencies and institutional investors, for example) are
equally subject to the whims of opinion and expecta-
tions: a fact that accounts for their inability to stabi-
lize markets and indeed, under certain conditions, to
avoid generating still further instability.12 To use
modern terminology, rather than “information cas-
cades”, what characterizes macroeconomic financial
instability are “opinion and expectation cascades”,
i.e., the alternate “contagion” with both optimism
and pessimism through the business cycle. Even the
best information system will be unable to correct
this “market failure”, as the whims of expectations
involve “information” about the future, which will
never be available.13
The consensus on the need to strengthen the in-
stitutional framework in which financial markets op-
erate has not been matched by a similar emphasis on
the importance of the coherence of macroeconomic
policies worldwide, i.e., on appropriate mechanisms
to internalize the externalities generated by national
macroeconomic policies. This issue is crucial in rela-
tion to both booms and crises, but the need to
strengthen the extremely weak existing arrangements
is particularly vital during booms, when IMF surveil-
lance is perceived by national authorities as an
academic exercise, consultative mechanisms seem
less necessary and “market discipline” has perverse
effects, as it does not inhibit excessive private
risk-taking or the adoption of pro-cyclical national
policies. Indeed, one of the most serious shortcom-
ings of the existing arrangements is that the current
institutions –both national and international– focus
their attention on crises rather than booms, thus un-
derplaying the preventive role that they should per-
form. Obviously, concerted expansionary action
during crises is also essential and, as was pointed out
in the introduction to this paper, the moves in that di-
rection after the Russian crisis are probably the sin-
gle most important reason for the relative though
incomplete normalization of capital markets in 1999.
The lack of adequate representation of developing
countries is another deficiency of the current ar-
rangements. The proposals to strengthen IMF surveil-
lance of macroeconomic policies and to transform
the IMF Interim Committee into a Monetary and Fi-
nancial Policy Committee are the most encouraging
in this regard, though the latter should be accompa-
nied by increased representation of developing coun-
tries on that Committee. Likewise, given its more
adequate balance in the representation of developing
and developed countries, the United Nations should
also play an enhanced role in the normative area,
either through the Economic and Social Council or
an Economic Security Council.
Enhanced provision of emergency financing dur-
ing crises is the third pillar of the system to prevent
and manage financial crises. This principle may be
called the principle of the “emergency financier”, to
differentiate it from the role that central banks play at
the national level as “lenders of last resort”, which is
not exactly matched by the IMF. More specifically,
the Fund provides exceptional financing but certainly
not liquidity: a fact that is reflected in the lack of au-
tomatic availability of financing when a crisis oc-
curs.14 The “moral hazards” raised by such financing
make it necessary to define access rules on the bor-
rowers’ side and to create orderly debt workout
mechanisms that guarantee that private lenders will
assume a fair share of the costs of adjustment.
The main lessons from recent crises are that:
i) large-scale funding may be required, though not all
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of it needs to be disbursed if support programs rap-
idly restore market confidence; ii) funds should be
made available before –rather than after– interna-
tional reserves reach critically low levels; and iii) be-
cause of strong contagion effects, contingency
financing may be required even by countries that do
not exhibit fundamental imbalances. At least the last
two of these lessons imply a significant departure
from the traditional IMF approach, which is based on
the principle of correcting fundamental balance of
payments disequilibria once they have become evi-
dent. Positive measures have been adopted in this
area, including a significant expansion of IMF re-
sources through a quota increase and the New Ar-
rangements to Borrow, which finally entered into
effect in late 1998; the launching of a new window in
December 1997 to finance exceptional borrowing re-
quirements during crises; and the creation of the
Contingency Credit Line in April 1999 to provide fi-
nancing to countries suffering the effects of conta-
gion, though under very restrictive eligibility
requirements.
The major controversies are over inadequate
funding, conditions for access and credit terms. With
respect to the first point, bilateral financing and con-
tributions to the IMF will continue to be scarce during
crises. This is a crucial issue, as the stabilizing ef-
fects of rescue packages will not take place if the
market feels that the intervening authorities (the IMF
plus additional bilateral support) are unable or un-
willing to supply funds in the quantities required. As
bilateral financing and contributions to the IMF will
continue to be scarce and unreliable in crises, the
best solution is to allow additional issues of Special
Drawing Rights (SDRs) during episodes of world fi-
nancial stress; these funds could be eliminated once
financial conditions normalize.15 This procedure
would bring a counter-cyclical element into world li-
quidity management and would give SDRs an en-
hanced role in world finance: a principle that
developing countries have advocated in the past and
should continue to endorse in the future. Second-best
alternatives would be to make more active use of
Central Bank swap arrangements under IMF or BIS
leadership, and to allow the IMF to raise the resources
needed in the market.
The broad issues raised by conditionality will be
discussed in section VI below. However, two issues
must be emphasized here. First, it has been argued
that contingency credit lines to deal with contagion
should be automatic, provided that countries fulfil
certain prior criteria, and should thus be detached
from traditional conditionality. The window created
recently for this purpose does not fully meet these
criteria: although the consultations provided for in
article IV of the IMF Articles of Association were
given an enhanced role in determining access in ad-
vance, such access still requires negotiations prior to
approval by the Board of Governors (a special “acti-
vation” review) and an explicit standby agreement.
Moreover, countries with current access to IMF fi-
nancing were not considered eligible; this is an im-
portant restriction, as it eliminates countries which
have experienced a strong recovery from past crises
but still have pending IMF credits. Finally, the combi-
nation of conditionality with the application of
harder terms than those traditionally used in regular
IMF financing for this window and for exceptional fi-
nancing (i.e., higher interest rates and shorter maturi-
ties) is also controversial. This eliminates the “credit
union” character of IMF financing but still falls far
short of being a “market condition”.
Internationally sanctioned debt standstills and
orderly workout procedures are essential mecha-
nisms to avoid the coordination problems implicit in
chaotic capital flight, to guarantee appropriate shar-
ing of adjustment costs by private lenders and, hence,
to avoid “moral hazard” issues associated with emer-
gency financing. Due to the effects that the use of
these mechanisms could have on their credit stand-
ing, borrowing countries are unlikely to abuse them.
Nonetheless, to avoid “moral hazard” issues on the
borrowers’ side, such arrangements must be subject
to international control, either by requiring prior IMF
approval or by allowing countries to call a standstill
unilaterally but then requiring that they submit it for
approval by an independent international panel,
whose authorization would give it legitimacy.16 A
third alternative could be to draft ex-ante rules under
which debt service would be automatically sus-
pended or reduced if certain macroeconomic shocks
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were experienced; such rules have already been in-
corporated in some debt renegotiation agreements.
The use of these mechanisms has four implica-
tions. Firstly, to avoid both free riding and discrimi-
nation against countries or groups of countries that
adopt them, they require the universal adoption of
“collective action clauses” in international lending.
The G-7 countries should take the lead in this pro-
cess, as they suggested in October 1998,17 for other-
wise it could become an additional source of
discrimination against “emerging markets”. Sec-
ondly, aiding countries in this way (“bailing in”)
should be encouraged by giving seniority to lending
that is extended to countries during the period in
which the standstill is in effect and during a later
phase of “normalization” of capital flows. Thirdly,
debt renegotiations under this framework must have
a short, strictly-defined time horizon beyond which
the IMF or the independent panel would have the au-
thority to determine the terms of rescheduling.
Finally, to avoid repeated renegotiations –one of the
most troublesome features of debt rescheduling oper-
ations in recent years– except for the portion that is
written off or refinanced on highly concessional
terms the service of the remaining portion should be
subject to certain contingent macroeconomic condi-
tions that determine debt service capacity (e.g., terms
of trade, normalization of lending, domestic eco-
nomic activity, etc.).
The most problematic of all rescheduling pro-
cesses in recent decades have been those associated
with heavily indebted poor countries (HIPCs). The
HIPC Initiative has been slow in its implementation
due to the complexity of the process for determining
eligibility (and, obviously, the conditionality at-
tached to it) and the lack of adequate funding.18 The
recent Cologne Debt Initiative may serve to over-
come some of these problems, providing “faster,
deeper and broader debt relief”.19 It is essential, of
course, that aside from eligibility criteria and the im-
plementation of the most generous terms, additional
funding should effectively become available. In
particular, in an environment of scarcity of official
development assistance (ODA) funds, it is essential
that the funds allocated to HIPC debt relief should
not crowd out fresh ODA. This would be regrettable,
as new financing is a necessary complement to
debt relief and the latter is unlikely, by itself, to ac-
celerate economic growth in heavily indebted poor
countries. Moreover, the lack of adequate funding
has generated additional demands that must be met
from the net income (profits) of development banks,
which has led some of them, including the World
Bank, to increase spreads and thus lending rates.
This means, paradoxically, that other developing
debtor countries will end up paying part of the
costs of debt relief. Financing problems are par-
ticularly acute in the case of regional and subre-
gional development banks: a fact which may
severely disrupt some of their activities if the trust
funds provided for under the HIPC Initiative do not
adequately cover the cost of debt relief.
The definition of international rules on capital
account regulation and exchange rate regimes has not
been addressed in this section because, under the
current incomplete world financial arrangements, na-
tional autonomy should continue to prevail in these
areas, as analysed in section VIII below.
V
Development finance
As indicated in section II, although adequate fi-
nancing from the IMF is certainly important to
low-income countries, the major issues for them are
associated with the need to guarantee adequate de-
velopment finance, through ODA and multilateral
lending, and to create mechanisms that will allow
them to participate more actively in private capital
markets. Given the relative magnitude of financing
to low-income countries (see table 2), the reversal
of ODA flows, particularly those originating in the
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largest industrialized economies, is certainly the
most important issue. As we already pointed out, it is
important that efforts to accelerate implementation of
the HIPC Initiative should not crowd out new ODA
financing in the budgetary processes of the industri-
alized countries. Indeed, in addition to a more ambi-
tious HIPC Initiative, the world requires an even
more ambitious and permanent “ODA Initiative”
aimed at effectively meeting internationally agreed
targets. An essential characteristic of this process, as
is emphasized in the following sections, should be
effective “ownership” of policies by developing
countries: a process that calls for less direction from
abroad and more emphasis on the role of national
development institutions. The latter objective re-
quires, in turn, respect for the central role that the
parliaments and governments of aid-receiving na-
tions should have in the global allocation of aid
through their budgetary processes and the vital role
that the governments of those countries should have
in directing traditional areas of public policy (such
as social policy and infrastructure), even when civil
society is given a major role in the execution of those
policies.
Equally important, however, is the need to speed
up the growth of multilateral lending. Due to the
high concentration of private flows in a few “emerg-
ing” economies, such lending will continue to play
an essential role even with respect to middle-income
nations. More broadly, multilateral lending will con-
tinue to play a very important role in at least four
areas: i) channeling funds to low-income countries;
ii) providing long-term finance to middle-income
and small countries which, because they do not have
a sufficiently high credit rating or because of the
fixed costs involved (e.g., in bond financing), do not
have adequate access to private funds; iii) acting as a
counter-cyclical means of compensating for fluctua-
tions in private capital market finance; and iv) facili-
tating the transition to new forms of private
financing. To these we should also add the traditional
“value added” of multilateral financing: lending-
associated technical assistance.
The first of these functions underscores the cen-
tral role that financing from the World Bank, the
International Development Association and the re-
gional and subregional development banks will con-
tinue to play in the immediate future. The second and
third functions emphasize the role that official devel-
opment assistance will continue to play even for
middle-income countries. It must be stressed, how-
ever, that the counter-cyclical provision of funds
should not be confused with the provision of emer-
gency balance of payments financing, which is es-
sentially a task of the IMF. However, the large-scale
requirements for counter-cyclical financing to
middle-income countries during crises may crowd
out financing to poor countries: a point which has
been made by the President of the World Bank.20
Thus, if multilateral development financing is not
significantly expanded, its role as a counter-cyclical
device will necessarily be very limited and will cer-
tainly be of secondary importance relative to its first
two roles, particularly the provision of long-term de-
velopment financing to poor countries. This is under-
scored by the data from table 2, which indicate that
multilateral financing in 1992-1997 represented only
13% of that provided by the private sector, excluding
FDI, and only 6% in the case of middle-income
countries. Consequently, if it is to carry out a useful
counter-cyclical function, this will certainly require a
significant increase in resources.
The fourth function is of fairly recent origin but
has been rapidly gaining in importance in the 1990s
and should become one of the primary focuses of
multilateral financing in the future. This function has
been associated in the recent past with direct financ-
ing to the private sector (by banks or associated fi-
nancial corporations) or with the design of guarantee
schemes to support private infrastructure projects in
developing countries. It could also be used to support
developing countries’ efforts to return to markets
during crises and, even more importantly, to support
initial bond issues by developing (and particularly
poor developing) countries seeking to enter private
capital markets. Co-financing or guarantee schemes
could be used for this purpose. It must be empha-
sized, however, that the full development of these
schemes would require a radical change in the man-
agement of guarantees by development banks be-
cause, under current practices, guarantees are treated
as if they were equivalent to loans: a practice which
severely restricts the banks’ ability to extend them.
Such an expansion of the role of development banks
in guaranteeing private financing has been criticized
on the grounds that it could involve excessive
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risk-taking by these institutions. Nonetheless, in a
world that will probably be dominated by private
financing, this may be absolutely essential in order to
prevent low-income countries from being left out of
major developments in the capital markets, and it
should therefore receive priority attention in the cur-
rent discussions.
In the recent debates on these matters, due em-
phasis has also been placed on the role that multilat-
eral development banks should play in financing
social safety nets in developing countries. Strong so-
cial safety nets are, indeed, essential for managing
the social repercussions of financial vulnerability in
the developing world. The concept itself is subject to
some confusion, however, as it is used to refer both
to the design of long-term social policies and to spe-
cific mechanisms to protect vulnerable groups during
crises. The term should probably be used to refer
specifically to the latter, although, as we will argue
below, these arrangements should be part of stable
social protection mechanisms. Although multilateral
banks have been involved in the former for a long
time and have also accumulated some experience
with the latter, the preferred mechanism since the
late 1980s has been social emergency funds (later
transformed in many countries into more stable so-
cial investment funds). Although they have intro-
duced some innovations in social policy, such as
competitive mechanisms to allocate resources and
participation by civil society in social policies, their
effects have been rather limited, their targeting has
not always been effective, and they may have
crowded out resources from long-term social poli-
cies.21 Other instruments have also been used in the
past by developing countries, including various types
of unemployment insurance (the main instrument
used for this purpose in the industrialized world),
emergency employment or emergency labour-intensive
public works programmes, income-support schemes
in conjunction with training, and some nutrition
programmes. The recent crisis seems to have led to
the design of new instruments: special subsidies for
households with school-age children (tied to school
attendance), and various support programmes de-
signed to ensure that households with an unem-
ployed head do not lose their homes during crises.
Recent analyses have drawn some basic conclu-
sions about these programmes. Firstly, safety nets
must be part of permanent social protection
schemes, as only a permanent scheme guarantees
that the programmes will respond without delay to
vulnerable sectors’ needs for protection during cri-
ses.22 This means, in turn, that financing must be fun-
damentally of a domestic character, with only a very
limited proportion of external financing, which may
contribute only marginally, if at all, during crises (see
below). Secondly, given the heterogeneity of labour
markets in developing countries, a combination of
several programmes, with different target groups, is
necessary.23 Thirdly, these programmes must be ade-
quately financed and should not crowd out resources
from long-term investment in human capital. This
leads in turn to a fourth conclusion: that the effective
functioning of social safety nets requires that
public-sector expenditure should include counter-
cyclical components. This would be impossible
–without generating inefficiencies in the rest of
public-sector expenditure– unless fiscal policy as a
whole is counter-cyclical: a point that has not been
sufficiently emphasized in current discussions. In the
absence of this counter-cyclical fiscal pattern, exter-
nal financing from development banks during crises
would be unnecessary or, at best, illusory, as overall
net fiscal financing requirements will actually de-
crease despite the increased spending associated with
social safety nets.
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The most controversial aspect of international emer-
gency and development financing is undoubtedly
conditionality. In the case of the IMF, this issue has
long been a central area of contention, but in recent
years –and even decades– the issue has become in-
creasingly troublesome for three different reasons.
Firstly, the scope of conditionality has been gradu-
ally expanded to include not only the realms of other
international organizations –quite often, for example,
that of the World Trade Organization and the devel-
opment banks– but also those of domestic economic
and social development strategies and institutions
which, as the United Nations Task Force has noted,
“by their very nature should be decided by legitimate
national authorities, based on broad social consen-
sus”.24 Secondly, whereas the legitimacy of condi-
tionality is indisputable when domestic policies are
the source of macroeconomic imbalances that lead to
financial difficulties, as well as being necessary to
avert “moral hazard” issues, it is unclear how this
principle applies when such difficulties are generated
by international crises and, particularly, by contagion
effects. As already noted, it is even less clear why
conditionality should be combined in such cases with
adverse credit terms. Finally, many observers have
criticized the over-adjustment (“overkill”) implicit in
some IMF programmes: a fact which has led the Fund
to allow some room for counter-cyclical fiscal poli-
cies in its adjustment programmes.
Even if the legitimacy of the principle of condi-
tionality –or, as it is sometimes defined, “support in
exchange for reforms”– is accepted, there are good
reasons for reviewing its characteristics. Indeed, the
perception that conditionality has been carried be-
yond what may really be necessary in order for the
Fund to perform its functions properly may be help-
ing to undermine its legitimacy. A strong argument
can therefore be made that the way to restore full
confidence in the principle of conditionality is by
reaching a renewed international agreement on how
it should be used.
Several principles can be advanced in this re-
gard. Firstly, conditionality should be restricted to
the macroeconomic policies that were its purview in
the past, and it should only be used when expansion-
ary policies are clearly associated with the genera-
tion of macroeconomic imbalances. Reforms of
domestic prudential regulation and supervision may
also be required, but in this case parallel agreements
should be made with the corresponding international
authorities (an issue which is still controversial, as
we have seen). Secondly, a suitable volume of
low-conditionality funds should be available when
the source of the imbalance is an international shock.
This principle should be fully recognized in the new
contingency credit line available to countries suffer-
ing the effects of contagion. Over and above the
pre-set limit for these funds, however, access to Fund
resources could also be subject to macroeconomic
conditionality on the traditional terms. Thirdly, as we
already noted, more stringent credit terms should not
be used as a complement to conditionality. Fourthly,
when signing an agreement with the Fund automatic
rules should be agreed upon by common consent
whereby the restrictiveness of the adjustment
programme would be eased should evidence of over-
kill become clear. Finally, regular official evaluation
of IMF programmes, either by an autonomous divi-
sion of the Fund (as in the World Bank) or by outside
analysts, should be introduced and the main conclu-
sions of these evaluations, after review by the Board
of Governors, should be explicitly incorporated into
regular Fund practice.
Similar issues have arisen in relation to develop-
ment finance. With respect to this matter, a recent
World Bank report which analyses the success of
structural lending, according to its own evaluation,
comes to the conclusion that conditionality does not
influence the success or failure of such programmes
C E P A L R E V I E W 6 9 • D E C E M B E R 1 9 9 920
24 United Nations, Report of the Task Force of the Executive
Committee on Economic and Social Affairs (1999a, section 5).
See also Group of 24 (1999), Feldstein (1998) and Rodrik
(1999b).
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REFORM: THE BROAD AGENDA • JOSÉ ANTONIO OCAMPO
at all.25 Nonetheless, according to the same report,
the effectiveness of aid is not independent of the eco-
nomic policies that countries follow. In particular,
the growth effects of aid are higher for countries that
adopt “good” policies, which, according to the Bank’s
(certainly debatable) definition, include a stable macro-
economic environment, open trade regimes, adequate
protection of property rights and efficient public bureau-
cracies that can deliver good-quality social services.
With regard to the effectiveness of aid, good policies
have an additional positive effect in the form of the
“crowding-in” of private financing. Neither of these
effects are present, however, in countries following
“wrong” policies. Expressed in terms that are now
familiar in the aid literature, the “ownership” of good
economic policies, i.e., the commitment of national
authorities to them, is what really matters. Condi-
tionality has no additional contribution to make in
these cases, and it is obviously ineffective in the case
of countries that do not follow good policies.
Curiously enough, on the basis of this study the
World Bank draws the conclusion that conditionality
is good after all, claiming that “Conditional lending
is worthwhile where reforms have serious domestic
support”26 and, in particular, that it “still has a role
–to allow government to commit to reform and to
signal the seriousness of reform– but to be effective
in this it must focus on a small number of truly im-
portant measures”.27 This statement is certainly para-
doxical if the conclusions of the report are taken at
face value. Rather, this study raises serious doubts
about the rationality of conditionality itself: a fact
which is, indeed, implicit in the idea that “owner-
ship” of economic policies is, after all, the essential
issue.28
A recent analysis by Rodrik comes to comple-
mentary conclusions which are extensive to short-
term macroeconomic policies.29 Thus, aside from ar-
guing that international arrangements should allow
for diversity in national development strategies (dif-
ferent “brands of capitalism”), this author makes a
strong argument that adequate institutions for con-
flict management, which can only be guaranteed by
national democratic processes, are crucial for macro-
economic stability, which, in turn, is vital for eco-
nomic growth. To borrow the term already used
above in another context, the “ownership” of macro-
economic adjustment programmes is also essential to
guarantee their political sustainability.
The issue of conditionality versus a country’s
ownership of economic policies is indeed essential to
the broader objectives of democracy at the world
level. There is clearly no sense in promoting democ-
racy if the representative and participatory processes
at the national level are given no role in determining
economic and social development strategies, as well
as the particular policy mix by which macroeco-
nomic stability is sought. Both these elements may
not only be relatively ineffective but will also lack
political sustainability if this role is appropriated by
international institutions or the aid agencies of the in-
dustrialized countries.
VII
The role of regional institutions
There are at least three arguments in support of a
strong role for regional institutions in the new finan-
cial order. The first one is that, as we have noted,
globalization also entails open regionalism. The growth
of intraregional flows of trade and direct investment is a
striking feature of the ongoing globalization process.
This factor increases macroeconomic linkages and thus
the demand for certain services provided by the interna-
tional financial system which we have analysed in
previous sections: macroeconomic surveillance and
internalization of the externalities that national
macroeconomic policies have on neighbouring coun-
tries, mutual surveillance of each other’s mecha-
nisms for the prudential regulation and supervision
of the financial system, and the regional effects of
potential debt standstills and workout procedures.
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Secondly, some of these services may be subject
to diseconomies of scale and it is unclear whether
others have economies of scale which are strong
enough to justify single international institutions in
specific areas (i.e., the existence of natural monopo-
lies). Traditional issues of subsidiarity are thus
raised. For example, macroeconomic consultation
and surveillance at the world level may be necessary
to guarantee policy coherence among major industri-
alized countries, but it would certainly not help to
manage the externalities generated by macroeco-
nomic policies on neighbours in the developing
world (or even within Europe). Due to differences in
legal traditions and the sheer scale of the disecono-
mies involved, surveillance of national systems for
prudential regulation and supervision of the financial
sectors, and even the definition of specific minimum
standards in this area, could be dealt with more ap-
propriately with the support of regional institutions.
Development finance can operate effectively at dif-
ferent scales and, as we will see, can perform certain
functions at the regional and subregional levels that
could not be performed at the international level.
Also, although the danger of regional and interna-
tional contagion means that the management of the
largest balance of payments crises should be as-
signed to a single world institution, it is unclear how
far we should push this assertion. Strong regional in-
stitutions can serve as regional buffers, as the
post-war Western European experience indicates. Re-
gional reserve funds can also play a useful role even
in the most serious crises (as shown by the Latin
American Reserve Fund, formerly the Andean Re-
serve Fund) and, if expanded, could even provide full
support to the small and medium-sized countries in
some regions. Also, as the increasing concentration
of balance of payments support in a few countries in-
dicates (see section II above), there may be biases in
the response of the international community accord-
ing to the size of the country involved: a fact which
would justify a division of labour between world and
regional organizations in the provision of such ser-
vices.
The third argument was already put forward in
section III: for smaller countries, access to a broader
menu of alternatives for managing a crisis or financ-
ing development is relatively more important than
the “global public goods” (such as global macroeco-
nomic stability) provided by the largest international
organizations, but in whose provision they assume
that they have little or no influence (i.e., they have
the attitude of “free riders”). Due to their small size,
their negotiating power vis-à-vis large organizations
is very limited, and their most important defence is
therefore the existence of competition in the provi-
sion of financial services from such institutions to
them.
There may be a fourth argument, of a political
economy nature: countries are likely to take quite
different attitudes to the analyses made by interna-
tional and by regional organizations (and to the at-
tached conditionality). To use the term employed in
the previous section, they are probably more likely to
have a sense of “ownership” of the latter, as they feel
they have a stronger voice in the analyses made by
regional organizations: a fact that will improve rather
than reduce their effectiveness. The fear that this
may lead to lax arrangements is unwarranted, as the
proposal to create and strengthen regional financial
institutions entails financial commitments by the de-
veloping countries to provide the capital for the cor-
responding reserve funds and development banks, so
that the countries will tend to closely monitor the
soundness of their activities. In reality, the supply of
capital is the single most important restriction on the
growth of these regional financial networks. The fact
that many of them will raise money in the market
will provide an additional means of control over their
operations.
The current discussions have underscored the in-
adequate supply of some services provided by inter-
national financial institutions, including some
“global public goods”. However, it would be wrong
to conclude from this statement that an increase in
that supply should come from a few world organiza-
tions. Rather, the organizational structure should
consist, in some cases, of networks of institutions
that provide the services required on a complemen-
tary basis, and in others of a system of competing or-
ganizations. The provision of the services required
for financial crisis prevention and management
should be closer to the first model, whereas in the
realm of development finance competition should be
the basic rule (and, in fact, should include competi-
tion with private agents as well). However, the purity
of the model’s structure is probably not the most im-
portant feature: it is desirable that in some cases
parts of networks should compete with each other
(e.g., regional reserve funds versus the IMF in the
provision of emergency financing), while in other
cases competing organizations should cooperate.
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This implies that the International Monetary
Fund of the future should not be viewed as a single,
global institution, but rather as the apex of a network
of regional and subregional reserve funds. In order to
encourage the development of the latter, incentives
could be created whereby common reserve funds
could have automatic access to IMF financing and/or
a share in the allocation of SDRs proportional to their
paid-in resources –in other words, contributions to
common reserve funds would be treated as equiva-
lent to IMF quotas.30 As already noted, regional re-
serve funds could not only provide most of the
exceptional financing for smaller countries within a
region, but also part of the financing for larger coun-
tries, and they could also serve, at least partly, to
deter would-be speculators from attacking the
currencies of individual countries.
This model should be extended to cover macro-
economic consultation and surveillance, as well as
the coordination and surveillance of national systems
of prudential regulation and supervision. Thus, re-
gional and subregional systems, including peer re-
view mechanisms, should be designed to internalize
the externalities that macroeconomic policies gener-
ate on neighbours. This would complement, rather
than substitute for, regular IMF surveillance. In the
area of prudential regulation and supervision, more
elaborate systems of regional information and con-
sultation, including the design of specific regional
“minimum standards”, could also play a positive
role. Again, peer reviews should be part of this sys-
tem. In the case of debt standstills and workouts, re-
gional mechanisms should at least play a role in
assessing the specific regional impacts that they may
have.
It is important to emphasize that, aside from
other functions considered in section V, subregional
development banks can play a significant role as a
mechanism to pool the risks of groups of developing
countries, thus allowing them to make more aggres-
sive use of opportunities provided by private capital
markets. In Latin America, an interesting experience
in this regard is that of the Andean Development
Bank (Corporación Andina de Fomento, CAF), an
institution owned in its entirety by developing coun-
tries. The fact that the credit ratings of this institution
have exceeded those of Colombia (the only Andean
country that has been classified as “investment
grade” in the 1990s and has thus been able to issue
debt obligations on favourable terms) indicates that
such a risk-pooling policy can be very effective.
As it is well known, Western Europe provides
the best example of regional financial cooperation in
the post-war period. The United States, through the
Marshall Plan, catalysed the initial phases of this
process, which underwent a dynamic deepening from
the design of the European Payments Union to a se-
ries of arrangements for macroeconomic coordina-
tion and cooperation that eventually led to the current
monetary union of most of its members. The history
of many institutions, including the Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements, is associated with these coopera-
tion efforts. At different stages, they demonstrated
the essential contribution that regional schemes can
make to the stability of the world economy. No simi-
lar schemes have been devised in the rest of the
world, although some proposals have been made, the
most ambitious of which was the Japanese sugges-
tion to create an Asian Monetary Fund.
On a much more limited scale, there are institu-
tions which have likewise played a useful role in the
developing world, particularly in the area of develop-
ment finance. In Latin America and the Caribbean,
for example, the Inter-American Development Bank
far outweighs the World Bank in development fi-
nance to the region. The Andean Development Bank
likewise outweighs the IDB in financing to the An-
dean region countries in recent years. The Andean
(now Latin American) Reserve Fund has played a
limited but constructive role in balance of payments
support to the Andean countries over the past two de-
cades. Under the existing integration schemes, some
dialogues have also taken place on macroeconomic
coordination, but progress has been rather limited in
this area. At all events, the call for stronger macro-
economic coordination mechanisms has been a com-
mon theme during the recent crisis.
An institutional framework such as that sug-
gested would have two positive features. First of all,
it could help to bring more stability to the world
economy by providing essential services that can
hardly be provided by a few international institu-
tions, particularly in the face of a dynamic process of
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Committee on Economic and Social Affairs (1999a, section 9)
and Ocampo (1999a).
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open regionalism. Secondly, from the point of view
of the equilibrium of world relations, it would be
more balanced than a system based on a few world
organizations, and this would increase the commit-
ment of less powerful players to abide by rules that
contribute to world and regional stability.
VIII
The realms of national autonomy
Whatever new international system is developed, it
is clear that it will continue to be a very imperfect
“financial safety net”. Consequently, a degree of
“self-insurance” by countries will continue to be es-
sential to avoid financial crises, as well as to avoid
“moral hazard” issues intrinsic in any support
scheme. This raises the question of the national pol-
icies necessary to guarantee financial stability and
the areas where national autonomy should be main-
tained. We consider that the international system
should continue to maintain national autonomy –at
least in the case of developing countries– in two crit-
ical areas: management of the capital account and
choice of the exchange rate regime. The choice of
development strategies is obviously another essential
realm in which national autonomy should prevail, as
we emphasized in section VI.
The experience of the developing countries indi-
cates that the management of capital account volatil-
ity requires: i) consistent and flexible macro-
economic management; ii) strong prudential regula-
tion and supervision of domestic financial systems,
and iii) equally strong “liability policies”, aimed at
inducing good public and private external and do-
mestic debt profiles.31 Traditionally, the emphasis has
been on crisis management, but the authorities
should focus their attention rather on the manage-
ment of booms, since it is in the periods of euphoria
of capital inflows, trade expansion and terms-of-
trade improvements that crises are incubated. Crisis
prevention is thus very closely linked with the proper
management of boom periods.
The nature of the policies to be used will natu-
rally vary according to the structural peculiarities of
different economies, as well as their macroeconomic
traditions and levels of development. In the macro-
economic area, the two main objectives should be to
avoid the accumulation of unsustainable levels of in-
debtedness by either public or private agents during
booms and to avoid imbalances in major prices, par-
ticularly the exchange rate and domestic asset prices.
In the fiscal area, the focus should be the
sustainability of public-sector debt ratios through-
out the cycle, which requires fiscal strengthening
during the upswing in order to give the authorities
sufficient freedom to permit some fiscal loosening
during the subsequent downswing in order to avoid
an excessive contraction of economic activity. In
contrast, as is well known, in open economies au-
thorities face major difficulties in applying contrac-
tionary monetary and domestic credit policies during
boom years, in the absence of adequate regulation of
capital inflows. Sterilized foreign-exchange reserve
accumulation is a first alternative, but experience
indicates that this may be self-defeating unless there
is adequate restraint on capital inflows, due to
interest-rate arbitrage. A second possibility is direct
control of the growth of credit from domestic finan-
cial intermediaries, but this alternative may actually
induce additional external borrowing in the absence
of adequate controls and tends to protect inefficient
intermediaries. A third alternative is the use of in-
creased reserve or liquidity requirements in respect
of the liabilities of the domestic financial system, but
this may also generate incentives for non-financial
agents to borrow abroad.
Regulations on capital inflows may also be es-
sential to avoid unsustainable exchange rate appreci-
ation during booms. Although some appreciation
may be inevitable and even an efficient way of ab-
sorbing the increased supply of foreign exchange, an
excessive revaluation may also generate irreversible
“Dutch disease” effects. The regulation of capital
inflows thus plays an essential role in open develop-
ing economies as a mechanism for monetary and
domestic credit restraint and for the avoidance of un-
31 The literature on national policies is extensive. See, among
recent contributions, ECLAC (1995 and 1998b), World Bank
(1998a, chap. 3), Ffrench-Davis (1999), Helleiner (1997), and
Ocampo (1999b).
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sustainable exchange rate appreciation during
booms. The macroeconomic effects of the regulation
of inflows have, unfortunately, received much less
attention in the past than the question of the regula-
tion of outflows during crises. The nature of such
regulations will be considered below. Regulations
governing outflows may nevertheless also play a role
as a way to avoid excessive increases in interest or
exchange rates, which may have adverse effects on
macroeconomic dynamics, including a greater risk
of domestic financial crises. Such regulations are
also an essential element when applying debt stand-
still and orderly debt workout procedures. It is essen-
tial, of course, that they be used as a complement and
not a substitute for fundamental macroeconomic ad-
justment.
As we pointed out in section IV, prudential regu-
lation and supervision must take into account not
only the micro- but also the macroeconomic risks
typical of developing countries. In particular, due ac-
count should be taken of the links between domestic
financial risk and changes in key macroeconomic
policy instruments, notably exchange and interest
rates. The risks associated with the rapid growth of
domestic credit, currency mismatches between assets
and liabilities, the accumulation of short-term liabili-
ties in foreign currencies by financial intermediaries
and the valuation of fixed assets used as collateral
during episodes of asset inflation must also be ade-
quately taken into account. Depending on the type of
operation, higher capital requirements, matching li-
quidity requirements or caps on the valuation of as-
sets should be established. Moreover, given these
macroeconomic links, prudential regulation should
be strengthened during periods of financial euphoria
to take into account the increasing risks being in-
curred by financial intermediaries. These links also
mean that the application of contractionary monetary
or credit policies during booms (e.g., higher reserve
requirements or ceilings on the growth of domestic
credit) may be a necessary complement to stricter
prudential regulation and supervision. Moreover, due
to the important externalities which large non-finan-
cial firms can generate for the domestic financial
sector, particularly in the context of exchange rate
depreciation, the external liability exposure of these
firms should also be subject to some regulation.
Tax incentives (e.g., limits on the deductibility of
exchange-rate losses) and rules that force
non-financial firms to disclose information on their
external liabilities may thus be relevant complements
to appropriate prudential regulation and supervision
of financial intermediaries.
The experience of many developing countries in-
dicates that crises are associated not only with high
debt ratios but also with inadequate debt profiles.
The basic reason for this is that, in conditions of un-
certainty, financial markets respond to gross –rather
than only to net– financing requirements, or in other
words, the rollover of short-term debts is not neutral
in financial terms. This means that “liability poli-
cies” aimed at improving debt profiles play an essen-
tial role. Although improving the external debt
profile should be the central role of such policies,
there is a strong complementary relationship between
good external and internal debt profiles. Thus, exces-
sive short-term domestic borrowing may force a
government that is trying to roll over debt during a
crisis to raise interest rates in order to avoid capital
flight by investors in government bonds. Also, exces-
sively high short-term private liabilities increase the
risks perceived by foreign lenders during crises: a
fact that may induce a stronger contraction of exter-
nal lending.
In the case of the public sector, direct controls
by the Ministry of Finance are an appropriate instru-
ment of a liability policy. In the private sector, ex-
change rate flexibility may also deter some
short-term flows and may thus partly operate as a “li-
ability policy”, but its effects are limited in this re-
gard, as it is unlikely to smooth out medium-term
financial cycles, which will then be reflected in a
parallel cycle of nominal and real exchange rates. Di-
rect controls on capital inflows may also be an ap-
propriate instrument for achieving a better private
debt profile, but a more interesting indirect
price-based policy tool is reserve requirements on
capital inflows, such as those used by Chile and Co-
lombia in the 1990s. These requirements are a partic-
ular type of Tobin tax, but the equivalent tax rate (3%
in the case of Chile for one-year loans and 10% or
more in Colombia during boom periods) is much
higher than that proposed for an international Tobin
tax. A flat tax has positive effects on the debt profile,
as it induces longer-term borrowing, for which the
tax can be spread over a longer time period and is
easier to administer. The effects of this system on the
magnitude of flows have been the subject of heated
controversy. At all events, since tax evasion is costly
and short- and long-term borrowing are not perfect
substitutes, the magnitude of flows should also be af-
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fected.32 A basic advantage of this instrument is that
it is targeted at capital inflows and is thus a preven-
tive policy tool. It also has specific advantages over
prudential regulations that could have similar effects,
as it affects both financial and non-financial agents
and it uses a non-discriminatory price instrument,
whereas prudential regulation only affects financial
intermediaries, is usually of a quantitative nature,
and the supervision is essentially discretionary.33
Simple rules are preferable to complex ones,
particularly in underdeveloped regulatory systems. In
this sense, quantitative controls, such as flat prohibi-
tions on certain activities or operations, may actually
be preferable to sophisticated price-based signals, but
simple price rules, such as those used by Chile and
Colombia, can also be effective. Any regulatory sys-
tem must also meet the additional requirement of
having adequate institutional backing. A permanent
system of capital account regulations, which can be
strengthened or loosened in the course of the busi-
ness cycles, is therefore preferable to the alternation
of free capital movements during booms and quanti-
tative controls during crises. Indeed, the latter system
may be totally ineffective if improvised during a cri-
sis, since the administrative machinery to make it
effective will not be operative and it may thus lead to
massive evasion or avoidance of controls. Such a sys-
tem is also pro-cyclical and leaves aside the most im-
portant lesson learned about crisis prevention: the
need to avoid over-borrowing during booms and thus
focus attention primarily on capital inflows rather
than outflows.
This indicates that capital account regulation
may be an essential instrument for crisis prevention
and management in a context of strong volatility of
capital flows and weak international financial safety
nets. It may be complementary to other desirable
policies in the macroeconomic and financial regula-
tory areas, and in some cases it may actually be pref-
erable to other alternatives. The foregoing analysis
also suggests the desirability of using capital account
regulation as a permanent policy instrument. Of
course, none of these mechanisms is foolproof, and
some developing countries may prefer to use policy
mixes that avoid their use (e.g., more active use of
fiscal and exchange rate policies, as well as of pru-
dential regulation) or may prefer a less intervention-
ist approach, even at the cost of greater GDP
volatility. Thus, the most compelling argument is for
maintaining the autonomy of developing countries to
manage their capital accounts.
There are actually no strong arguments in favour
of moving towards capital account convertibility.34
There is no evidence that capital mobility leads to ef-
ficient smoothing of expenditures in developing
countries throughout the business cycle, and on the
contrary there is strong evidence that in these coun-
tries the volatility of capital flows is an additional
source of expenditure instability. There is also no ev-
idence of an association between capital account lib-
eralization and economic growth, but there are some
indications that point in the opposite direction.35 In
simple terms, the argument is that, even if it were
true that freer capital flows, through their effects on a
more efficient savings-investment allocation process,
have positive effects on growth, the additional vola-
tility associated with freer capital markets has the op-
posite effect. As already noted, the absence of an
adequate international financial safety net is an
equally important argument in this connection. Why
should developing countries give up this degree of
freedom if they do not have access to adequate
amounts of contingency financing with well-defined
conditionality rules and there are no internationally
agreed standstill and debt workout procedures? As
we pointed out in section III, this is a crucial issue
for countries without significant power in the inter-
national arena, for whom renouncing a possible
means of crisis management is a costly alternative. In
reality, there are strong similarities between today’s
international financial world and the era of “free
banking” at the national level, when, in the absence
of central banks as lenders of last resort and offi-
cially managed bank rescue schemes, inconvertibility
of private bank notes was a necessary legal alterna-
tive in the face of bank runs.
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Similar arguments could be used to claim that
there are no grounds for limiting the autonomy of de-
veloping countries to choose their exchange rate re-
gime. There are certainly some virtues in the argument
that, in the current globalized world, only convertibility
regimes or totally free-floating exchange rate regimes
can generate sufficient credibility in the eyes of private
agents. However, the imposition of any international
rules in this area would be unfortunate. The advantages
and disadvantages of these extreme positions, as well
as of interventionist regimes in between the two,
have been subject to extensive debate and, of course,
have given rise to a considerable store of experience.
In practice, countries almost invariably choose inter-
mediate regimes: a fact that is probably explained
not only by the deficiencies of the extremes, but also
by the many other demands that the authorities face.
The choice of the exchange rate regime has, nonethe-
less, major implications for economic policy that
must be recognized in macroeconomic surveillance.
Also, as already noted, domestic prudential regula-
tions must take into account the specific macroeco-




In this paper it has been argued that the agenda for
international financial reform must be broadened in
at least two senses. First of all, it should go beyond
the issues of financial crisis prevention and resolu-
tion, on which the recent debate has been focused, to
cover also those associated with development fi-
nance for poor and small countries, measures to
overcome the strong concentration of private and
even official financing in a few large “emerging”
economies, and the importance of the “ownership” of
economic and development policies by countries.
Secondly, it should consider, in a systematic fashion,
not only the role of world institutions but also of re-
gional arrangements and the explicit definition of ar-
eas where national autonomy should be maintained.
These issues should be dealt with in a representative,
balanced negotiation process capable of overcoming
some of the adverse political economy features that
characterize the current debate.
In the area of financial crisis prevention and res-
olution, a balance must be struck between, on the
one hand, the current emphasis on the need to im-
prove the institutional framework in which financial
markets operate, and on the other the still insufficient
attention to or action on the design of appropriate
schemes to guarantee the coherence of macroeco-
nomic policies worldwide, the enhanced provision of
emergency financing during crises, and the creation
of adequate debt standstill and orderly debt workout
procedures. In the area of development finance, em-
phasis should be given to the need to increase fund-
ing to low-income countries, including the use of
multilateral development finance to support in-
creased participation of low-income and small
middle-income countries in private capital markets.
The role of multilateral development banks in the fi-
nancing of social safety nets during crises should
also be emphasized. The enhanced provision of
emergency and development financing should be ac-
companied by a renewed international agreement on
the limits of conditionality and full recognition of the
central role of the “ownership” of development and
macroeconomic policies by developing countries.
It has also been argued that regional and subre-
gional institutions should play an essential role in in-
creasing the supply of “global public goods” and
other services in the area of international finance.
The required financial architecture should in some
cases take the form of a network of institutions that
provide the services required in a complementary
fashion (in the areas of emergency financing, surveil-
lance of macroeconomic policies, prudential regula-
tion and supervision of domestic financial systems,
etc.), while in others (particularly in development fi-
nance) it should consist rather of a system of com-
petitive organizations. The fact that any new order
will continue to form only an incomplete “financial
safety net” means both that national policies will
continue to play a disproportionately large role in
crisis prevention and that certain areas should con-
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tinue to be realms of national autonomy (particularly
capital account regulations and the choice of ex-
change rate regimes). Regional institutions and na-
tional autonomy are particularly important for the
smaller players in the international arena, who would
gain significantly from competition in the services
provided to them and from greater freedom of action
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